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Abstract
This paper analyzes tax competition when welfare maximizing jurisdictions levy
source-based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose tax-ecient capital-
to-debt ratios. Under separate accounting, multinationals shift debt from low-tax to
high-tax countries. The Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game is character-
ized by underprovision of publicly provided goods. Under formula apportionment,
the country-specic capital-to-debt ratio of a multinational's aliate is independent
of the jurisdiction's tax rate. Public good provision is either too large or too small.
If the formula is predominately based on capital shares and if there is a positive debt
externality there is clearly underprovision under formula apportionment.
JEL Classication: H25, H42, H73.
Keywords: Multinational enterprises, nancial policy, prot shifting, corporate tax-
ation, tax competition.
Address: University of Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Am Plan 2,
35032 Marburg, Germany, eMail: wrede@wiwi.uni-marburg.de1 Introduction
Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that multinationals shift prots from
high-tax to low-tax countries, especially by means of debt nancing and transfer pricing.
There is convincing evidence from micro data that prot shifting is sizeable (see, e.g.,
Mintz and Smart, 2004; Devereux, 2006; Dischinger, 2007; Weichenrieder, 2009) and that
it implies a signicant loss in tax revenue for high-tax countries (see Huizinga and Laeven,
2007). In the past, literature on income shifting focussed on transfer pricing, but more
recently Mintz and Smart (2004), Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008), and Schindler
and Schjelderup (2008) have developed theoretical models of the tax-ecient debt nancial
policies of multinationals. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) discovered that U.S. multination-
als alter the overall level and composition of debt in response to tax incentives, internal
nance being particularly sensitive to tax dierences. Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme
(2008) observe for European multinational rms that the leverage ratio is more sensitive
to taxation on account of international debt shifting than it is for stand-alone domestic
rms. Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg, and Winner (2009) nd that foreign-owned European
rms on average exhibit a signicantly higher debt ratio than their domestically owned
counterparts in the host country and that the gap in the debt ratio increases with the host
country's statutory corporate tax rate.
Governments respond to income shifting behavior by changing the tax code and the tax
rate. Hauer and Schjelderup (2000) argue that income shifting may induce governments
to eliminate investment allowances in an eort to oset revenue losses, thus increasing
the eective tax rates on capital. Mintz and Smart (2004) and Hong and Smart (2007)
point out that international tax planning may reduce tax burdens on mobile capital and
so facilitate investment that can oset the negative consequences of lost revenue. This
conjecture is empirically conrmed by Overesch (2009) who, based on a panel of German
inbound investments, nds a positive tax response of real investments with a decreasing tax
rate in the foreign direct investor's home country. In response to sizeable prot shifting,
the European Commission suggested a transition from separate accounting to a common
tax base and formula apportionment (see European Commission, 2001). Although the
idea seems like a good one at rst glance, since its inception the proposed benets, namely
1a reduction in compliance costs, tax planning, and tax competition, have been seriously
challenged (see, for an overview, Fuest, 2008).
Ever since Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), it is well known that tax competition leads
to underprovision of public goods when jurisdictions cannot use the full set of tax instru-
ments. When rms can shift prots from high-tax to low-tax countries without relocating
capital, tax rates may be too high (see Eichner and Runkel, 2008; Nielsen, Raimondos-
Moeller, and Schjelderup, 2009). Harmonizing the tax base and employing formula ap-
portionment does not solve the problem of inecient public good supply. Scholars reach
various conclusions as to whether there is under- or overprovision under formula appor-
tionment. According to Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller, and Schjelderup (2009), the positive
scal externality of taxation and the negative aggregate investment externality are respon-
sible for this ambiguity. Pethig and Wagener (2007) argue that equilibrium tax rates are
too low for property-share apportionment but tend to be too high for other formulas. Eich-
ner and Runkel (2008) unambiguously nd underprovision. Kolmar and Wagener (2007)
claim that tax competition leads to suboptimally low tax rates if and only if the investment
elasticity of the tax base is lower than the investment elasticity of the apportionment fac-
tor. When jurisdictions can appropriately tax residents, tax competition does not distort
the public good supply. This has been shown for the standard model of tax competition
by Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) and has been conrmed for formula apportionment by
Eggert and Schjelderup (2003).
This paper aims at extending previous analyses of corporate tax competition under
separate accounting and formula apportionment when rms are able to shift prots from
high-tax to low-tax countries via debt nancing. It sets up a many-region general equilib-
rium model of multinational rms that make decisions regarding employment, investment,
and leverage ratios. The symmetric Nash equilibrium of welfare-maximizing countries en-
gaged in corporate tax competition is analyzed. This contribution diers from the extant
literature on tax competition in several ways:
1. In contrast to most papers on this topic which assume revenue-maximizing govern-
ments (see, e.g., Pethig and Wagener, 2007; Kolmar and Wagener, 2007; Eichner and
Runkel, 2008), this paper analyzes the strategies of welfare-maximizing governments.
2Private consumption eects, as well as revenue eects, are considered.
2. Previous papers on corporate tax competition considers decreasing returns to scale
technology (see, e.g., Pethig and Wagener, 2007; Eichner and Runkel, 2008); however,
this paper assumes linearly homogeneous production functions. Since corporate taxes
are distorting as long as equity is not fully deductible, even with constant returns to
scale economic prots are non-zero.
3. Following Eichner and Runkel (2008), the total stock of capital is xed, but the return
to capital is endogenous. Most other papers consider the small-country case where
the return to capital is exogenous (see, e.g., Wellisch, 2004; Pethig and Wagener, 2007;
Pinto, 2007; Riedel and Runkel, 2007; Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller, and Schjelderup,
2009).
4. Most papers treat prot shifting as an additive-separable component of prots (see,
e.g., Riedel and Runkel, 2007; Eichner and Runkel, 2008). This paper takes a dierent
approach by explicitly modeling the debt policy of multinationals where debt is an
implicit prot shifting device leading to complex interactions with investment.
In short, this paper sets up a more general model than do previous papers. The main
results can be summarized as the following:
1. Symmetric Nash equilibria of tax competition games are generically inecient under
separate accounting as well as under formula apportionment.
2. Tax competition under separate accounting always leads to underprovision of public
goods; however, overprovision cannot be ruled out under formula apportionment.
Nevertheless, under apportionment using a purely capital-share-based formula, un-
derprovision will occur unambiguously as long as a weak suciency condition is
fullled. Underprovision is more likely when a unilateral tax rate increase reduces
debt in neighboring countries, thereby increasing the neighbors' tax base.
3. If leverage ratios are exogenously given, underprovision is the unambiguous outcome
of tax competition even under formula apportionment.
3Pinto (2007) and Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller, and Schjelderup (2009) analyze tax compe-
tition in a small, open federation framework where governments maximize the welfare of
their citizens. Pinto (2007) focuses on formula apportionment only. Nielsen, Raimondos-
Moeller, and Schjelderup (2009) compare separate accounting and formula apportionment
using a rather simple prot-shifting mechanism and consider only capital-share-based for-
mulas; they could not establish underprovision under separate accounting. Furthermore,
Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller, and Schjelderup (2009) do not consider locally captured in-
come in their welfare analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model and describes
its general features. Sections 3 and 4 analyze market equilibria and equilibria of the tax
competition game under separate accounting and formula apportionment, respectively.
Section 5 discusses the results by comparing them briey, on the one hand, with the
benchmark without prot shifting and, on the other hand, with the policy outcome when
internal debt is explicitly modeled. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
I consider an economy having n identical jurisdictions, with n  2, where the population
in each jurisdiction is normalized to 1. There are a great many identical multinational
enterprises (MNEs) operating a plant in each jurisdiction. These rms produce a private
good with a constant returns to scale technology. Since the production function is linearly
homogenous, the number of rms and output per rm are indeterminate. Without loss of
generality, I proceed as if the total output is produced by a single representative MNE that
behaves competitively. It employs Ki units of capital and Li units of labor in jurisdiction i
to produce F(Ki;Li) units of output whose price is normalized to 1. Marginal productivity
of any input is positive and decreasing: FK > 0, FL > 0, FKK < 0, and FLL < 0.1 Since the
production function is linearly homogenous, F = FKK +FLL and FKL =  FKKK=L > 0.
By assuming that marginal products of capital become rather large when capital intensity
approaches 0, it is ensured that the MNE will indeed produce in all jurisdictions. For
1Partial derivatives are indicated by a subscript.
4example, the Inada conditions would guarantee this. The wage in jurisdiction i is denoted
by wi; the common return to capital by r.
The MNE maximizes total prots net of corporate taxes, . Each jurisdiction levies a
source-based tax on corporate income while exempting foreign-source income of domestic
residents. The rm nances investment with equity Ei and debt Di: Ki = Ei + Di, the
debt-to-capital ratio in jurisdiction i is denoted i = Di=Ki. Equity is not deductible,
but debt is fully deductible from tax liabilities in every jurisdiction. In accordance with
most of the literature, I assume that costs per unit of capital C(i) are associated with
borrowing, with C(0) = C0(0) = 0, C0(i)  0, C00(i) > 0, and lim!1 C0() = 1. These
costs reect increasing bankruptcy risks and bankruptcy costs.2 In my basic model, all
debt is external debt; internal debt is discussed as an extension. However, regardless of
whether debt is internal or external, the MNE will shift debt toward high-tax countries, as
will be shown later. The economic prot in jurisdiction i is output minus labor costs and
capital costs including borrowing costs:
i = F(Ki;Li)   wiLi   [r + C(i)]Ki; i = 1;:::;n: (1)




i = F(Ki;Li)   wiLi   riKi; i = 1;:::;n: (2)
In this model, I assume without loss of generality that borrowing costs are not tax de-
ductible. Including borrowing costs in the tax base would not change the results qualita-
tively.
Capital is perfectly mobile, labor is inelastically supplied and perfectly immobile. Each
jurisdiction is endowed with  K units of capital and  L units of labor. The common return
to capital r is determined so as to clear the capital market in all jurisdictions; the wage wi




Ki    K

= 0; (3)
2In my model, the optimum leverage ratio in a tax-free world would be 0. I could easily intro-
duce a strictly positive benchmark leverage ratio without aecting qualitative results, see Schindler and
Schjelderup (2008).
5the labor markets clear at
Li    L = 0; i = 1;:::;n: (4)
The representative individual in jurisdiction i derives utility from private consumption
Xi and a publicly provided good Gi. The utility function U(Xi;Gi) exhibits positive and
diminishing marginal utilities and is strictly quasi-concave. To exclude corner solutions, I
assume that marginal utilities are suciently large when private and public consumption
approaches 0. The representative individual in jurisdiction i owns one share of the MNE,




+ r  K + wi L; i = 1;:::;n: (5)
The government of jurisdiction i pays for the provision of good Gi with its tax revenue
Ti. The marginal rate of transformation between the private and the publicly provided
good is constant and normalized to 1: Gi = Ti. National governments set tax rates non-
cooperatively to maximize the welfare of their citizens U(Xi;Gi). The timing is as follows:
1. National governments simultaneously set tax rates ti, 0  ti  1, i = 1;:::;n.
2. National wages and the common interest rate are determined such that the MNE
maximizes its prots through choice of labor demand, capital demand, and debt,
and markets clear.










= 0; i = 1;:::;n: (6)
The marginal rate of substitution between private and public consumption is equal to the






; i = 1;:::;n: (7)
I focus only on symmetric Nash equilibria of the tax-competition game where all ju-
risdictions set the same tax rate. A symmetric equilibrium is characterized by Ki = K,
Li = L, wi = w, Di = D, i = , ti = t, Xi = X, and Gi = G, for i = 1;:::;n.
6Unilateral tax rate changes give rise to two types of externalities, a private consumption
externality (PCE) and a public good externality (PGE):
PCE = (n   1)
dXj
dti





Market equilibrium Under separate accounting, the tax base in jurisdiction i is the
taxable prot t












s.t. Ei  0; i = 1;:::;n: (9)
Since the marginal costs of borrowing approach innity as the debt-to-capital ratio ap-
proaches 1, the non-negativity constraints will never be binding. The market equilibrium
is characterized by the rst-order conditions with respect to labor demand, debt, and
investment for i = 1;:::;n
FL(Ki;Li)   wi = 0; (10)
tir   C
0(i) = 0; (11)
(1   ti)FK(Ki;Li)   r   C(i) + iC
0(i) = 0; (12)
and the market-clearing conditions of Equations (3) and (4). Since labor costs are fully
deductible, the marginal product of labor is equal to the wage rate. The rm's aliate in-
creases debt until marginal costs of borrowing are equal to tax refunds. Rewriting Equation










it is obvious that the user cost of capital exceed the return to capital r; thus there are
incentives to underinvest. Holding the return to capital xed, and taking Equation (11)
into account by setting di=dti = r=C00(i), it follows that dF i
K=dti > 0. Underinvestment
is more severe in high-tax countries than in low-tax countries.
7Plugging rst-order conditions into the denitions for prots and taking linear homo-







K   ir)Ki; i = 1;:::;n: (14)
Economic prots and taxable prots are non-zero, since the rental rate of capital r falls
short of the user cost of capital F i
K. However, as a consequence of constant returns to
scale, prots net of corporate taxes are zero in every jurisdiction.
From the rst-order conditions and the market clearing conditions, the impact of taxa-
tion on investment, borrowing, wages, and the interest rate can be calculated in a symmetric












































In response to an increase in one country's tax rate, rms shift capital abroad, which,
due to labor-capital complementarity, reduces wages in the country that raised taxes and
increases wages abroad. The increase in the tax rate also implies higher user cost of capital,
which mitigates investment incentives and, eventually, reduces the return to capital. A
lower return to capital reduces tax savings abroad and, thus, the debt-to-capital ratio. In
the country that raised taxes, the MNE will raise the debt-to-capital ratio if direct tax
savings exceed the dampening interest rate eect, an eect that becomes more likely as
the number of countries involved increases. Although it is possible to characterize with
some precision the impact of a unilateral tax rate increase on relative debt, the changes of
absolute amounts of debt are less intuitive. However, it can be shown that total debt nD
will grow in response to a unilateral increase in the tax rate if and only if r > FKt.
Tax competition Since prots are zero, individual income eectively consists only of
capital and labor income, Xi = r  K + wi L. Hence, the impact of a unilateral tax rate










K(FK   r)[t(1   )   n(1   t)]
n(1   t)(1   t)
< 0; i = 1;:::;n; (16)
where symmetry is taken into account. Furthermore, tax revenue in jurisdiction i is
Ti = tiKi[FK(Ki;Li)   ir]; i = 1;:::;n; (17)
implying in a symmetric set-up
dTi
dti


















; i = 1;:::;n: (18)





C00FKKn(1   t)(1   t)
; i = 1;:::;n; (19)
where
	 = FKKKr(1   t)t[(FK   r)t   nr(1   t)] (20)
+C
00(FK   r)f(n   1)(FK   r)t(1   t) + FKKK[n(1   t)   (1   )t]g:
Since dXi;dti < 0, the Nash equilibrium is at the left-hand side of the perceived Laer
curve where 	 must be negative. Equations (16) and (19), together with Equations (6),
determine the Nash equilibrium of tax competition under separate accounting. To discover
whether jurisdictions would benet from cooperating on tax rates, I determine the impact
of coordinated tax rate changes for i = 1;:::;n:
dXi
dti









+ (n   1)
dTi
dtj














This implies a marginal rate of transformation under symmetric changes of
 
dXi=dti + (n   1)dXi=dtj
dTi=dti + (n   1)dTi=dtj
=
C00(FK   r)
C00(FK   r) + rt(FKt   r)
: (23)
The real transformation curve under symmetry is independent of the number of countries.
Furthermore, the marginal rate of transformation is larger than 1 if r > FKt, that is, when
9coordinated tax rate increases raise total debt. In this case, higher borrowing costs are
associated with increasing tax rates and public good quantities. For tax rates close to
0, this inequality should always be fullled. When, on the other hand, an increase in all
tax rates weakens borrowing incentives, extending the public sector saves borrowing costs.
Marginal costs of publicly provided goods are below pure production costs.
Since the marginal rate of transformation under symmetric coordinated changes, Equa-
tion (23), and (dXi=dti)=(dTi=dti) do not coincide, the outcome of tax competition is
inecient. The private consumption externality
PCE
SA =
(1   )K(n   1)(FK   r)t
n(1   t)(1   t)
(24)
is positive, but the public good externality PGE








dXi=dti + (n   1)dXi=dtj




C00(n   1)(FK   r)t(1   t)(C00(FK   r)2 + FKKKr(r   FK)t))
	[C00(FK   r) + rt(FKt   r)]
:
Taking into account that 	 is negative, the whole term is positive provided that the
marginal rate of transformation under symmetric coordinated changes is positive. How-
ever, the Nash equilibrium must be on the left-hand side of the Laer curve, since otherwise
Equation (25) would be negative, implying that each jurisdiction taxes on the downward-
sloping part of the perceived Laer curve, which would contradict the assumption of
welfare-maximizing behavior. Hence, the perceived marginal rate of transformation ex-
ceeds the true marginal rate of transformation. As a consequence, all jurisdictions would
benet from coordinated increases in tax rates and publicly provided good. The proposition
summarizes this result:
Proposition 1 Under separate accounting, the symmetric Nash equilibrium of tax compe-
tition is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods. All jurisdictions would
benet from small increases in tax rates and public good quantities.
The ndings are illustrated by Figure 1. The gure shows private and public good
quantities in a representative jurisdiction in the full symmetric setting. The potential pro-










Figure 1: Underprovision of publicly provided goods
under a hypothetical fully ecient tax system. However, since costs of equity are not
deductible under corporate taxation, even with full coordination, the production possi-
bility curve lies below the potential curve. The transformation curve under coordination
is labeled PPCreal. In the tax competition game, non-cooperatively taxing governments
perceive higher marginal costs of tax rate increases, since they expect capital ight and
other nancial reactions in response to unilateral tax changes. The perceived transforma-
tion curve is indicated by PPCperc. Equation (25) shows that the perceived transformation
curve is steeper than the real transformation curve, as shown in Figure 1. The symmetric
Nash equilibrium (X;G), where the perceived transformation curve and an indierence
curve have the same slope, clearly lies on the real production possibility curve. Starting at
this equilibrium, jurisdictions would benet from moving along the real production possi-
bility curve toward a larger quantity of publicly provided goods. In Figure 1 it is assumed
that the real production possibility curve is always steeper than the potential production
possibility curve, but this would only hold when coordinated tax rate changes reduce total
borrowing. However, allowing for convex parts of the production possibility curve would
not have any qualitative eect on the underprovision result.
114 Formula apportionment
Market equilibrium Under formula apportionment, the MNE faces a uniform tax rate












s.t. Ei  0; i = 1;:::;n: (26)
Tax bases are consolidated and distributed to jurisdictions according to a formula based
on the capital share Ki=
P
j Kj, the sales share F(Ki;Li)=
P
j F(Kj;Lj), and the payroll
share wi L=
P













; i = 1;:::;n: (27)
The weights of the capital share, the sales share and the payroll share sum up to 1:
 +  +  = 1. Hence, the jurisdictions' shares also sum up to 1:
P
j Sj = 1. The MNE's










The rst-order conditions of the MNE's optimization problem are for i = 1;:::;n










k = 0; (29)
r   C
0(i) = 0; (30)











k = 0: (31)
Since the eective tax rate is independent of the jurisdiction, the optimum debt-to-capital
ratio  is the same in all jurisdictions. In its decision regarding labor and capital, the
MNE takes into consideration that changes in employment and capital stock aect tax
base shares and, therefore, the eective tax rate. High tax rates reduce marginal benets
of employment and investment.
In a symmetric equilibrium  = ti = t, Si = 1=n, Si
Lj =  (=L+FL=F)=n2 < 0, Si
Kj =
 (=K + FK=F)=n2 < 0, Si
Li =  (n   1)Si
Lj, and Si
Ki =  (n   1)Si
Kj. Using symmetry,
the rst-order conditions and the market-clearing conditions imply that unilateral tax
12rate changes aect the interest rate and national wages just as they do under separate
accounting. Hence, dr=dti, dwi=dti, and dwi=dtj are determined by Equation (15).3 The























If and only if r > FKt, a unilateral tax rate increase increases the uniform debt-to-capital
ratio and therefore total debt. A negative debt externality would be associated with an
increase in one jurisdiction's tax rate. The MNE would lower debt and, therefore, tax
liabilities in other jurisdictions provided that interest rate changes do not overcompensate.
Plugging rst-order conditions into the denitions for prots and taking linear homo-
geneity into account, yields
i = (F
i


































k; i = 1;:::;n:
Economic and taxable prots are non-zero; outside a symmetric equilibrium, even net
prots per country are not zero. However, it can be shown that total net prots FA are
zero. Prots and losses cancel out. Hence, even under formula apportionment, individual
income consists only of capital and labor income.
Tax competition Since unilateral tax rate changes aect the common interest rate and
national wages under formula apportionment exactly as they do under separate accounting,
the impact of a single country's tax rate change on its private consumption, i.e., dXi=dti,
is the same under both tax systems. Hence, if there is a dierence between the two tax
competition game equilibria it must be related to tax revenue eects, dTi=dti. Tax revenue




Kj[FK(Kj;Lj)   r]; i = 1;:::;n; (34)
3Wages react dierently in the model of Eichner and Runkel (2008) because their production function








































gives the impact of a country's tax rate on its share in the tax base. Any unilateral
increase in the tax rate reduces the jurisdiction's share in the global tax base no matter
what the weights in the formula are. Ceteris paribus, Si
ti depends positively on each weight.
Clearly, the capital-share weight aects Si
ti more strongly than the sales share. If the tax
rate elasticity of the jurisdiction's capital stock, (ti=K)(dKi=dti), exceeds half the tax rate
elasticity of the payroll, (ti=wi L)(d(wi L)=dti)=2, the capital share's weight is also greater
than the payroll share's weight.
A unilateral increase in the tax rate reduces the tax base if it increases r, that is, if
C
00(FK   r) + r(FKt   r) < 0; (37)
which requires a positive relationship between the a single tax rate and total debt, i.e.,
r > FKt.
Although there are substantial dierences in individual tax rate eects, the impact
of coordinated tax rate increases is the same under the formula approach as it is under
separate accounting. This is because separate accounting and formula apportionment are
indistinguishable when tax rates are uniform. As a consequence, the true production
possibility curve is always given by Equation (23).
Since interest rate and wage eects of taxation are the same under both approaches,
the private consumption externality is also positive: PCE
FA = PCE
SA > 0. The public
good externality
PGE


































is positive if a unilateral tax increase either reduces the debt-to-capital ratio or increases
it only moderately, i.e., if d=dti suciently low.
14Due to these externalities, the symmetric Nash equilibrium of tax competition is gener-
ically inecient. However, in contrast to separate accounting, both overprovision and
underprovision of public goods are possible. Only in special cases can the deviation be
signed. For a fully capital-share-based formula, i.e., for  = 1, it can be shown that
PGE
FA =
(n   1)tfC00(FK   r)[FKKK(1   t)   (FK   r)(1   t)]g
C00n(1   t)(1   t)FKK
(40)
 
(n   1)t[(1   t)(r   FKt)tKrFKK]
C00n(1   t)(1   t)FKK
:
If FKt > r, the public good externality is unambiguously positive and jurisdictions will
clearly undersupply public goods. The underlying force is the positive public debt exter-
nality: A unilateral tax rate increase reduces the debt-to-capital ratio and thus increases
the tax base.
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 2 Under formula apportionment, the symmetric Nash equilibrium of tax
competition is generically characterized by an inecient provision of publicly provided
goods. If the formula is purely capital share based and Fk > r=t, jurisdictions unam-
biguously undersupply public goods.
A direct comparison of the supply of public goods under separate accounting and for-
mula apportionment in terms of exogenous parameters is generally not possible. A system
change may or may not aggravate the underprovision problem.
5 Discussion
In this section, I discuss the results by comparing them to the benchmark case of tax
competition without prot shifting and by subsequently analyzing internal debt.
5.1 Fixed debt-to-capital ratio
When the debt-to-capital ratio is xed at a uniform level in all jurisdictions, the MNE
cannot use nancial policy to reduce its tax burden in response to tax rate dierentials.
Hence, dj=dti  0 for all i;j. As a consequence, there is no excess burden of taxation when
15all jurisdictions levy the same tax rate. The true production possibility curve PPCreal has
slope  1. However, the perceived production possibility curve under separate accounting






FKKK[t(1   )   n(1   t)]
FKKK[t(1   )   n(1   t)]   (n   1)(FK   r)t(1   t)
> 1: (41)
Non-cooperatively taxing jurisdictions will undersupply public goods. Coordinated tax
increases would increase welfare in all jurisdictions.
Underprovision of publicly provided goods is also the outcome of tax competition under
formula apportionment when the debt-to-capital ratio is xed. Not only is the private
consumption externality positive, but the public good externality
PGE
FA  := (n   1)
dTj
dti








> 0; i = 1;:::;n: (42)
Hence, autonomous jurisdictions will unambiguously undersupply public goods.
Whether underprovision will be more severe under separate accounting or under formula
apportionment depends on the weights of capital, sales, and payroll in the formula. For a
fully capital-share-based formula, i.e., for  = 1, it can be shown that
dTi
dti





   
FA 
=
(n   1)(FK   r)Kt
n(1   t)
> 0: (43)
Under separate accounting, there is a stronger incentive to raise taxes than under formula
apportionment. Hence, introducing formula apportionment at the symmetric Nash equi-
librium of the tax competition game under separate accounting would result in lower tax
rates. Formula apportionment aggravates the underprovision problem. I conclude:
Proposition 3 If the leverage ratio is xed at a uniform level, the symmetric Nash equi-
librium of tax competition is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods re-
gardless of whether separate accounting or formula apportionment is applied. If the formula
is purely capital share based, underprovision is more severe under formula apportionment
than under separate accounting.
165.2 Internal debt
Following Mintz and Smart (2004) and Schindler and Schjelderup (2008), I now consider
internal debt as an explicit device for prot shifting. I add tax deductions for internal
debt and also its costs to the analysis. The internal-debt-to-capital ratio in jurisdiction
i is i = Bi=Ki. Costs of internal borrowing are Q(i)Ki, with Q(0) = Q0(0) = 0, and
lim!1 Q0() = 1. Costs of internal lending are 0, Q() = 0 for  < 0, costs of internal
borrowing positive and increasing, Q0()  0 and Q00()  0 if  > 0. Since lending is
only internal, the total sum of internal debt is 0:
Pn
j=1 jKj = 0. Economic prots and
taxable prots become
i = F(Ki;Li)   wiLi   [r + C(i) + Q(i)]Ki; i = 1;:::;n: (44)

t
i = F(Ki;Li)   wiLi   r(i + i)Ki; i = 1;:::;n: (45)















jKj = 0 and Ei  0; i = 1;:::;n: (46)
First-order conditions with respect to investment and internal borrowing in jurisdiction i,
i = 1;:::;n, are
(1   ti)FK(Ki;Li)   r   C(i)   Q(i) + iC
0(i) + iQ
0(i) = 0 (47)
tir   Q
0(i)    = 0; (48)
where  is the Lagrangian of the internal debt constraint. Denoting the lowest tax rate by
tm, the internal debt condition can be written as
(ti   tm)r = Q
0(i); i = 1;:::;n: (49)
The rm's aliate in the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate will lend to all other al-
iates. The size of internal debt is mainly determined by the tax rate dierential. Inter-
nal assets in the minimum tax jurisdiction are determined by the borrowing constraint:
Bm =  
P
j6=m Bj. However, in a symmetric equilibrium, there will be no internal borrow-
ing.
17Although the calculations are slightly more complex, it can be shown that with internal
borrowing, the symmetric Nash equilibrium under separate accounting is characterized by
underprovision of publicly provided goods. This should not be a surprise. External debt
is a substitute for internal borrowing as means of prot shifting.
Finally, since under formula apportionment, the benets of internal debt are always
zero, the MNE will not issue internal debt, regardless of the tax rates. The tax game
under formula apportionment is not aected by internal debt.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzed tax competition when welfare-maximizing jurisdictions levy source-
based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose leverage ratios in a tax-ecient
way. First, separate accounting, under which multinationals shift debt from low-tax to
high-tax countries, was considered. It was shown that in this situation the Nash equilibrium
of the tax competition game is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods.
Nex analyzed was formula apportionment, under which the country-specic leverage ratio
of a multinational's aliate is independent of the jurisdiction's tax rate. The paper shows
that public good provision is still inecient and characterized the inecient outcome.
Finally, it was shown that underprovision is the unambiguous outcome of tax competition
if leverage ratios are xed at a uniform level.
The model could be extended in several ways. For example, asymmetry could be
introduced. Asymmetric tax competition when prot shifting is feasible has been neglected
in the literature to date. Stoewhase (2005) is an exception, but he considers capital taxation
instead of prot taxation. Asymmetry is studied in the literature on tax havens (see, e.g.,
Hong and Smart, 2007; Slemrod and Wilson, 2006). Another extension could involve
considering the deductible share as a policy variable, as Pinto (2007) has done.
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